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BAR BRIEFS
certainty. Generally speaking, a person injured going to or from work
is not in the course of employment, and the injury is not compensable.
As soon, however, as the premises of the employer, or some road or way
which supplies the only means of access to the premises, is reached,
the person is in the course of employment. In this connection it might
be of interest to cite the case of Hornburg vs. Morris, 157 N. W. 556,
where it is held that the streets and sidewalks of a city are not premises
so far as their use by a city employee, using them solely for the purpose
of going to a definite place of employment, is concerned. The use of a
conveyance to and from work, when supplied by the employer, and used
because required or as a matter of right by virtue of the contract of
employment, brings the one using it within the term "in the course of
employment."
The question of dependency arises in death cases. The lines of proof
required in such cases are: i. What sum of money is required and
necessary to maintain the alleged dependent in the manner and style to
which he or she has been accustomed? 2. What income has the alleged
dependent, and what are the sources of such income? 3. What has been
the contribution of the decedent during the twelve months preceding
death, and what was the purpose of such contribution?
It is usually in cases where the dependency is less than total that
attorneys fail to present competent testimony upon which the Bureau
may base a fair decision. Where the dependency is total, the law itself
provides the amount of the award. Where it is less than total, however,
it becomes important that all the evidence bearing upon the percentage
of that dependency be presented, if a fair and equitable award is to be
entered. A widow need not prove dependency if she was living with
her husband at time of injury resulting in death.
DISSENTING QPINION
Mr. W. H. Stutsman voices his disagreement with the review of
the case of Chrysler vs. Belfield in last month's -issue of Bar Briefs
in the following: "With all due regard to 'A. E. A.' I cannot but feel
that the Supreme Court decision of Chrysler Light & Power Co. vs.
City of Belfield has gone right over his head. At any rate, the para-
graph in Bar Briefs for May will mislead the thoughtless lawyer who
looks no farther than the statement-made. The Supreme Court did not
hold that the Board of Railroad Commissioners could not change
service rates fixed in the franchise for the general consumer, for that
was not in issue. The question there was whether the franchise fixing
rates for street lighting, and service furnished directly to the city, as
distinguished from the inhabitants of the city, was a binding contract
which prevented a change of rates by the Board of Railroad Commis-
sioners. The Court held that the Utility Act, passed subsequently to
the adoption of the franchise, did not confer any such power on the
Commission." (Ed.-We appreciate the criticism, and wish there
were more of. them, favorable or unfavorable, but respectfully direct
attention to the follwing: That the general consumers were not
parties to the action, hence, the only rates "in issue" were the rates
charged to the corporate city; that it is agreed that the reviewing state-
ment might "mislead the thoughtless lawyer"; but that there are few,
if any, "thoughtless lawyers" in North Dakota, hence, few would draw
an unwarranted inference from the statement of the reviewer, whose
"head" may or may not be properly designated by "his.")
